Introduction

SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL*

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is,
in my view, the most ambitious and complex undertaking by the
world community of nations since the creation of the United Nations itself in 1945. The conference engages the attention, and vitally affects the interests, of all nations, developed and
developing, maritime and non-maritime, and coastal and landlocked. It is at once a political, economic and legal negotiation. It
involves the diverse aspirations of more than 150 nations and reflects the advent of new technologies for utilizing the oceans and
their resources. The conference also responds to the widely felt
need for generally agreed rules of law to prevent chaos and reduce the potential for conflict on over 70% of the earth's surface
covered by the oceans.
The current Law of the Sea conference is, of course, not the first
attempt by the United Nations to write a charter for the oceans.
The first United Nations Law of the Sea conference was held in
1958 and adopted four conventions that constituted important progress in advancing the rule of law over the oceans. But the failure
of this conference, and a follow-up conference in 1960, to agree on
the terms and conditions for expanding the territorial sea beyond
the traditional three miles hastened the rash of extended maritime claims that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's. To a large extent, it was President Truman's proclamation in 1945' unilaterally
claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf that served as a
precedent for other nations' claims.
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In addition to its failure to resolve important substantive issues,
the 1958 conference suffered from a serious procedural flaw that
limited the effectiveness of its achievements. By adopting four
separate conventions instead of a comprehensive document addressing all issues, and by not prohibiting reservations, the conference irresistibly tempted the participating governments to
ratify only those confentions that suited their narrow interests or
to qualify their adherence by extensive reservations. One of the
principal lessons of the 1958 conference is that if nations are permitted to pick and choose what they will and will not be bound by
in such a complex negotiation, it will be impossible to prevent the
chaos and conflict that a Law of the Sea is intended to prevent.
When I was first elected to the Senate in 1960, the second Law
of the Sea conference had failed. Having worked on the staff of
the secretariat at the 1945 San Francisco conference that created
the United Nations, I was particularly concerned that the United
Nations had not been successful in such an important endeavor. I
was also concerned that the United States was devoting so much
attention to exploring the frontiers of outer space while neglecting ocean space, one of the most important frontiers of inner
space.
Accordingly, in 1967 1 introduced Senate Resolution 1722 calling
upon the Johnson Administration to take the lead in convening a
third Law of the Sea conference to develop a comprehensive
treaty governing all of the military and economic uses of ocean
space. At about the same time, Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador
to the United Nations, made his now famous proposal to set aside
the resources of the world's seabeds as the "common heritage of
mankind." 3 While the United Nations was establishing a special
seabeds committee in response to Pardo's proposal, the Johnson
Administration scoffed at my idea of a comprehensive Law of the
Sea treaty.
When the Nixon Administration came into office in 1969, I renewed my effort by introducing Senate Resolution 924 which now
included a draft treaty. This time, my proposal met with a more
favorable response. The new Administration, recognizing the
need to prevent an expansion of the arms race in the oceans, took
the initiative to bring about the negotiation of the Seabed Arms
Control Treaty of 1971,5 banning weapons of mass destruction
from the seabeds. In addition, concerned about the difficulties
2. 113 CONG. REC. 27316 (1967).
3. Verbal note from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, dated August 17, 1967, circulated as U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
4. 115 CONG. REC. 2605 (1969).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1980)).
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that expanded maritime claims posed for our naval and air mobility, the Nixon Administration was instrumental in promoting the
convening of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
The first substantive meeting of that conference was held in
1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. I was present as a Congressional adviser and vividly recall the idealism and high hopes that accompanied the launching of this century's most ambitious maritime
adventure. The participants were determined to profit from the
mistakes of the 1958 and 1960 conferences by endorsing the concept of a comprehensive treaty. So strong was the commitment
generated in Caracas that it has been sustained during seven
years of difficult and often frustrating negotiations.
In attempting to produce a single comprehensive Law of the
Sea treaty that would be universally accepted by a world that had
expanded from 112 independent countries in 1960 to 146 in 1973,
the governments represented in Caracas dedicated themselves to
achieving the following awe-inspiring objectives:
-avoiding, or minimizing, the likelihood of unnecessary crises
through the establishment of an agreed legal framework for the
oceans in which disagreements can be resolved peacefully and in
accordance with law;
-protecting freedom of navigation and related freedoms, which
are essential to the maintenance of international peace and security and international trade upon which the well being of all nations depend;
-- conserving and managing the living resources of the oceans
so as tot ensure the full utilization of this source of food for this
and future generations;
-encouraging the exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources of
the continental margin to help ensure that energy needs are satisfied in the years ahead,
-ensuring that the mineral resources of the deep seabed-the
common heritage of mankind-benefit all nations of the world,
both developed and developing;
-obtaining global recognition of the rules and regulations essential to protect the marine environment from pollution; and
-encouraging the conduct of marine scientific research. 6
6. 1 UNCLOS I[ OR (51st plenary mtg.) 216 (1974) (statement of Conference
President, H.S. Amerasinghe).

These objectives have not changed since the negotiations began, although international appreciation of their importance and
the consequences of failing to achieve them has increased as the
negotiations have proceeded. Virtually universal agreement has
been reached that a regime of generally recognized rights and obligations in the oceans is clearly preferable to the uncertain process of claim and counterclaim and the endless arguments over
how, in a given situation, state practice becomes accepted as customary law.
At the same time, however, the specific and often narrow national interests of all nations must be perceived to be better protected with a treaty than without one. Lofty principles and legal
tidiness will not be enough to inspire broad support for a comprehensive treaty.
For maritime nations, the freedoms of navigation and overflight
through straits, archipelagoes and allareas of the seas beyond a
narrow territorial sea are vital.
For coastal nations, sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources in a 200-mile zone and in the continental margin beyond the zone are critical.
For land locked and geographically disadvantaged nations, amelioration of other nations' offshore claims through the possibility
of access to the living resources of neighboring economic zones
and revenue sharing from resource exploitation of the continental
margin is essential.
For certain island nations, recognition of their archipelagic aspirations, including national unity, is compelling.
For all nations, a regime for the exploration and exploitation of
the deep seabed beyond the limits of the continental shelf is essential, although perceptions may differ on the essential elements. All nations also have an important stake in a system of
peaceful third-party settlement of disputes and arrangements to
protect the maritime environment.
In my view, the draft treaty that is emerging would accommodate these and other national interests better than would going it
alone without a treaty or attempting to negotiate mini-treaties on
separate subjects with a limited number of other nations. A comprehensive treaty that results from negotiations involving more
than 150 governments cannot and should not be expected to be an
ideal document as viewed from the perspective of any single nation-for it is the nature of multilateral treaties that they are compromises involving many different, oftentimes conflicting,
interests.
In the case of a package deal such as the Law of the Sea treaty
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that is intended to deal with all issues relating to the oceans, the
only way that any one nation can ensure that provisions protecting its particular interests are widely supported is to reciprocate
by agreeing to provisions that serve other nations' interests.
Sometimes the balance of pluses and minuses in such trade-offs
is very close; but as long as the balance is positive, it is preferable
to pursuing an unrealistic goal involving only pluses and no minuses.
The beauty of a comprehensive treaty without reservations is
that it locks everyone into adhering to provisions that protect everyone's interests. Without a comprehensive treaty, no nation can
be sure that its interests will be respected by others.
In the absence of a treaty, nations will try to protect their interests in incoherent and conflicting ways. No consensus will evolve
to accommodate all interests; for there will be no web of quids pro
quos. For example, in the absence of a treaty, it is likely that the
trend to a 12-mile territorial sea will continue but without any
clear consensus for aircraft, ships and submarines to transit over
100 straits less than 24 miles wide that would be completely enveloped by overlapping 12-mile territorial seas.
Virtually all of the strategically significant straits from a U.S.
policy perspective fall within this category. The Strait of Hormuz,
through which the world's lifeblood, oil, passes in the Persian
Gulf; the Strait of Gibraltar, which separates the Atlantic Ocean
from the Mediterranean Sea; and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which link the Pacific and Indian Oceans, are just a few of
the seaways vital to U.S. economic and security interests
threatened by creeping jurisdictional claims. Of course nations
like the U.S. could attempt to negotiate transit rights on an individual basis or simply ignore the territorial claims of straits
states; but in either case the results will be uncertain, time consuming, and the diplomatic costs potentially high.
Similarly, landlocked and island nations will not receive golbal
recognition of their paramount concerns; and nations interested
in exploiting the resources of the deep seabed will neither have a
universally recognized right to mine nor exclusive mineral rights
to a minesite-a major uncertainty affecting the ability of miners
to attract capital. As every would-be deep seabed mining concern
is aware, unilateral actions by the United States to guarantee exclusive mining rights through national legislation alone would be
meaningless, with no clear standing in international law, and

highly vulnerable unless the U.S. is prepared to defend individual
sites with a military presence. Even the mini-treaty concept cannot afford the kind of protection that would likely be needed in order for mining companies to carry out the billion dollar
investments required. Thus, both developed and developing nations interested in benefitting from deep seabed mining will be
left with an empty slogan-the common heritage of mankind.
Continuing the search for the necessary accommodations to
conclude a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty is absolutely essential if the rule of law in international relations is to be advanced. So much progress has been made already in the
conference that it would be a tragedy if misplaced pride, unrealistic ambition, or undue influence by one particular interest group
were to prevent the conference from succeeding in its efforts to
produce a comprehensive, widely-supported treaty.
In this connection, the Administration's announcement on
March 3 that the U.S. representative at the conference had been
instructed "to seek to insure that the negotiations do not end at
the present session of the conference, pending a policy review by
the United States Government," 7 sent shock waves through the
delegations of participating nations who had just begun to assemble in New York for the opening of the tenth session of the conference. Although it was to be expected that a new
Administration would want to review the complex issues in the
conference, the timing of the announcement-just seven days
before the conference was to begin and coinciding with an intensification of mining industry lobbying against the treaty-and the
peremptory tone of the announcement, aroused bitter speculation
among many conference participants that the United States was
about to revise its objectives so radically as to pose a direct threat
to the success of the conference.
The negative signals sent out by the March 3 announcement
were in sharp contrast to statements made by the chief U.S. negotiator, Elliot Richardson, at the end of the last conference session
that wound up in August 1980. At that time Ambassador Richardson stated in an August 29 press conference in Geneva that only
one final working session would be required to deal with the four
principal outstanding tasks:
-establishing a preparatory commission to lay the foundation
for the International Seabed Authority,
-making provisions for protecting those who make investments
in seabed mining in the interval between signature of the treaty
and its entry into force,
7. Inner office release of Law of the Sea Interagency Group, March 2, 1981.
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-determining what entities other than states may become parties to the treaty, and
-completing work on the wording of the more than 400 treaty
articles in the six official languages. (In subsequent statements,
Ambassador Richardson substituted maritime boundary delimitation for this basically procedural question.)8
Ambassador Richardson left the clear impression that these
were essentially the only issues that stood in the way of U.S. support for a treaty, and in a statement in the conference's plenary
session on August 26, he called upon certain other delegations to
"abandon demands for significant substantive changes that could
upset the balance of the convention and hurt the chances for its
general acceptance." 9 That was sound advice to other delegations, and it ought to be heeded by the United States as well.
The deep seabed articles of the draft treaty clearly need improvement, and the United States should not sign a treaty unless
they are improved. But Ambassador Richardson had already
launched an initiative to accomplish that objective, and there was
every indication that his effort would succeed, although probably
not in only one final working session as he had hoped.
Apart from the need to improve the seabed articles, I believe
that the remaining provisions are very much in America's national interest. These provisions provide for a maximum 12-mile
territorial sea, free passage through international straits and archipelagoes, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, national resource jurisdiction over the continental margin, protection of the
environment, security for scientific research, and dispute settlement. Together, these provisions constitute a well-balanced package not only in the interest of the United States but the
international community as a whole.
The United States has played a leading role both in convening
the Law of the Sea Conference and in advancing its objectives.
Through the years it has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in this
country. The conference began under a Republican Administration, and the objectives sought during both the Nixon and Ford
Administrations were supported and advanced under President
Carter. Under every Administration, the chief U.S. negotiator was
8. Press conference, United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland (Aug. 29,
1980).

9. 3 UNCLOS M OR (136th plenary mtg.) 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR136
(1980) (statement of Ambassador Richardson).

a Republican. The fate of the conference now rests in the hands
of a third Republican Administration and another Republican negotiator.
Some cynics have speculated that the Reagan Administration
has already decided to scuttle the conference and to look for
other ways to advance America's interests in the oceans. I am
willing to take the Administration's pronouncements at face
value-namely, that it wishes an opportunity to assess the provisions in the draft text and that no other motives are intended.
The Administration for its part must take steps, which it has not
done to date, to allay the concerns raised by the announcement of
the policy review-a review which is apparently slated to drag on
for the remainder of this year.
Even without a conscious intention to abandon treaty negotiations, the Administration could do irreparable harm if it decides
to propose changes in the draft text going substantially beyond
those enumerated by Ambassador Richardson last year. At the
same time, other governments would do well to work closely with
the Administration as it conducts its review and not to assume
the worst.
I am by nature an optimist and a firm believer in patient, quiet
diplomacy. There is no reason why the conference must complete
its work this year; and if a modest delay enhances the likelihood
of a treaty ultimately entering into force with American support,
the entire world will benefit. Such a delay, however, is not without risk. A quick review of events since the first conference convened in 1958 reveals that unilateral claims by nations to new
rights in the oceans have proceeded at an ever accelerating pace.
To delay too long would mean additional demands to consider
changes of provisions already contained and agreed to in the text.
But it is important for the United States to reaffirm its commitment to a comprehensive treaty and to make known its objectives
as quickly as possible. Otherwise, I fear that the spirit of confidence and goodwill that has sustained the conference over many
difficulties in the past will unravel, and a golden opportunity to
advance the cause of world peace and cooperation will be lost, to
no one's benefit.

